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Abstract 
Economists Oz Shy introduced the definition of undercut-proof property (“UPP”) prices in a model of 
Bertrand competition involving loyal consumers (‘A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching 
costs’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 20, pp. 71-87, 2002). Shy’s seminal 
paper allows applied researchers to measure the switching costs faced by locked-in consumers. 
Although there is increasing interest in demonstrating consumer inertia in retail markets opened up to 
competition, Shy’s approach has not received much attention. The present paper shows that the UPP’s 
lack of appeal in this context stems from a strong assumption of identical switching costs in the 
theoretical model, whereas real data are more likely to reveal asymmetric values for these costs. We 
revisit the UPP by considering asymmetric switching costs straight from the theoretical model. Doing 
so enables us to show that more rigorous conditions relating the values of switching costs to market 
shares are necessary in order for UPP prices to be valid predictions of these costs, which consequently 
increases the predictive power of Shy’s model. This improvement is illustrated with two examples 
borrowed from Shy’s paper. 
 
JEL Codes: D43, D83. 
Keywords: Price competition, Switching costs, Undercut-Proof Property. 
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1. Introduction 
In the present paper, I revisit the model of imperfect price competition, suggested in Morgan and Shy 
(2000) then Shy (2002b), which allows the measurement of consumer switching costs as between two 
or more brands. In the case of two firms, each sets its price subject to the constraint that the other will 
not find it profitable to undercut that price and grab all its customers. Shy (2002a, p. 75) suggests that 
those prices satisfy a property that he calls the Undercut-Proof Property (“UPP”). At equilibrium, 
UPP prices are a function of firms’ market shares and unobservable switching costs. Using 
observations based only on prices and market shares, these variables can be mapped into two levels of 
switching costs (one for each brand).  
Though the method is quick and easy as suggested by its inventor Shy, the UPP has not very received 
much attention. In a laboratory experiment designed to investigate spatial price competition, Orzen 
and Sefton (2008) and Peters and Stroble (2009) find weak evidence in support of the UPP as a 
solution concept in favour of other refinements of the Bertrand-Nash paradigm. There are at least two 
reasons for not favouring one solution concept over another. First, switching costs are neither 
restricted to being equal nor to taking positive values; a situation that is not allowed by the above 
authors who consider the original UPP solution concept. Second, Morgan and Shy (2000) then Shy 
(2002a, 2002b) consider switching costs as a parameter that is exogenous to the firm whilst 
endogenous to the modeller, whereas it is set at the beginning of the models tested in the 
aforementioned laboratory experiments. This endogenous nature of consumer switching costs in Shy’s 
model is part of what seems to make the UPP so difficult for many to accept.1 Unlike travel costs that 
can be calculated ex-ante the economic transaction, the whole value of switching costs as modelled by 
Shy can only be calculated ex-post, that is to say, given prices and market shares.  
Rather than attempt to further situate Shy’s model of price competition with loyal consumers relative to 
other theoretical solutions, I shall instead try to improve its predictive power. I revisit the UPP in the 
two-firm case by giving more precise conditions for the range of market shares and switching costs 
under which prices satisfy the UPP. Unlike Morgan and Shy (2000), and Shy (2002b), we assume in the 
theoretical model underlying the UPP that consumers may have asymmetric switching costs. One 
implication is that the theoretical prediction made by these authors to the effect that larger firms charge 
lower prices (Morgan and Shy, 2000, p. 1) becomes a particular case. Furthermore, our model 
accommodates negative switching costs by interpreting them as net rather than gross values as suggested 
                                                 
1. It is worth noting that in the literature, the meaning of “endogenous switching costs” differs from that which we 
use here. Switching costs are considered as endogenous to a firm when it creates them (e.g., the impossibility of 
transferring one’s local phone number from the incumbent to a competing carrier). In the present paper, 
“endogenous” is used with respect to the modelling practice. In Shy’s model, switching costs are a function of the 
firms’ prices and market shares. In Orzen and Sefton, prices and market shares are functions of the switching cost. 
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in Green’s 2000 working paper (see Krafft and Salies, 2008 with respect to Green’s contribution). Shy’s 
definition (2002a, pages 189-191) of the undercut-proof property solution concept assumes symmetric 
costs, however these costs become asymmetric values when he applies the UPP for measuring switching 
costs from real data. This improvement in the predictive power of Shy’s model should contribute to 
making the UPP more able to explain the data in future laboratory experiments. 
2. UPP with real and asymmetric switching costs 
Two firms a and b sell a homogenous product to N consumers. There is a share 0α >  of brand a 
oriented consumers and 1 0α− >  of brand b oriented consumers. Firm a’s customers perceive a net 
cost sab of switching to firm b while firm’s b customers perceive a net cost sba of switching to a. The 
utility functions of each type of consumer are:  
⎩⎨
⎧
−−
−= basTU
TUu
abbb
aaa  brand  toswitching if
 brand with staying if          (1a) 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−−
−= absTU
TUu
baaa
bb
b  brand  toswitching if
 brand with staying if         (1b) 
where Ui denotes gross utility for each type of consumer. Ta is firm a’s price and Tb is firm b’s price. 
Negative switching costs may be defined as follows: let s  be the ‘gross’ level of switching costs 
common to both types of consumers, and denote ab UU −  as the value that firm a’s customers attach 
to buying from firm b. Let abb UUv −≡ , then abs  and bas  are bvs−  and avs− , respectively where 
ba vv −≡ . Let an  and ab nn −≡1  denote the shares of customers buying brand a and b, respectively. 
These numbers depend on prices and switching behaviours of both types of customers: 
0   if  
  if  
1  if 
a b ab
b ba a b ab
a b ba
T T s
n T s T T s
T T s
α α
> +⎧⎪= − ≤ ≤ +⎨⎪ < −⎩
 (2a) 
0   if  
1   if  
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b a ba
a ab b a ba
b a ab
T T s
n T s T T s
T T s
β α
> +⎧⎪= − − ≤ ≤ +⎨⎪ < −⎩
 (2b) 
 
The following definition generalises Shy’s definition (2002, p. 75) of UPP prices and market shares to 
the situation where the two types of consumers have asymmetric net switching costs. 
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Proposition 1. Prices β
α β
+= −1
ab baU
a
s n s
T
n n
, α
α β
+= −1
U ba ab
b
s n sT
n n
, and market shares α α=n , 
β α= −1n  satisfy the UPP if { }min 0, (1 ) ba abs sα− − < , where ∈bas IR . 
Assume the larger firm is a ( 1α α≥ − ). If, 
(a) sba>0 and –(1–α)sba<sab< 1
α
α− sba then a charges the lower price. 
(b) sba>0 and sab> 1
α
α− sba then a charges the higher price. 
(c) sba<0 and sab ≥ 0 then a charges the higher price. 
Assume firms share the market equally. If, 
(d) baab ss >  then a charges the higher price. 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Note that if 0<bas  then abs  must be strictly greater than zero for UPP prices to exist. In all cases 
where prices satisfy the UPP, switching costs are (1 )U Uab a bs T Tα= − −  and U Uba b as T Tα= − . Prices UaT  
and UbT  become simplified so as to effectively assimilate to those in Shy (2002, p. 75) when sab ≡ sba. 
In this case (under equal switching costs) Shy’s model (2002b) predicts that the larger firm charges 
the lower price. Indeed it is possible to write sgn( ) sgn(1 2 )U Ua bT T α− = −  [see (iii) in the proof of 
Proposition 1 in the Appendix]. We draw the reader’s attention to the fact that our assertion is 
different to and stronger than that actually stated by the author: “… under the UPP, the firm with the 
higher market share charges a lower price …” (Shy, 2002b, p. 76, footnote 4). In fact, Shy’s assertion 
is true under stronger conditions relating market shares to switching costs of which one is that 
switching costs are identical.  
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the larger firm may also charge the higher price thus showing that the 
direction of the relation between price differentials and market shares depends on the relative levels of 
switching costs. Accordingly, the assertion that “…equilibrium prices of brands monotonically 
diverge when the brands become more differentiated…” (Morgan and Shy, 2000, p. 1) may be 
restated as: holding bas  (respectively abs ) constant, equilibrium prices of brands monotonically 
diverge when abs  increases (respectively bas  decreases). 
More critically, Proposition 1 shows that more rigorous conditions relating the values of switching 
costs to market shares are necessary in order for UPP prices to be valid predictions of these costs, 
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given actual data on prices and market shares. This contrasts with Morgan and Shy (2000, p. 2) who 
found that an UPE exists for any value of the switching cost. It is also now clear that these authors’ 
assertion that the larger firm charges the lower price is true not only under equal switching costs but 
also in a larger region of the values for abs  and bas . Our refinement of Shy’s model (2002a, 2002b) 
makes it of greater interest to studies of firms’ pricing behaviour in markets where consumers face 
switching costs. In fact, real data tend to show a positive correlation coefficient between prices and 
market shares and a negative net cost of switching from small firms (see e.g. Krafft and Salies, 2008 
and the applications in Shy, 2002b). Our generalisation widens its application to include situations 
such as where the larger firm charges the higher price and the smaller firm serves customers with the 
higher switching costs. The region of the values for abs  and bas  compatible with UPP prices is given 
in Figure 1 as well as the sub-regions where Ub
Ua TT >  and those where UbUa TT < . Any values for abs  
and bas  below the thick line are not compatible with the existence of UPP prices. 
 
Figure 1: UPP prices given the region of the values for abs  and bas . 
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3. Comment on Shy’s results (2002b) in the banking and cellular phone markets 
Once the applied researcher has calculated switching costs for customers of two competing firms (note 
that the model can easily be applied for measuring consumer switching costs between sets of more than 
two competing firms; see Krafft and Salies, 2008; Shy, 2002b), it is recommended that he or she identify 
whether these values are compatible with one of three situations (a)–(c) described in Proposition 1.2  
For example, in the case of the Israeli cellular phone market, Shy (2002b, Table 1) finds that the 
larger firm has consumers with lower switching costs and who also pay the lower price. Since the 
existence of UPP prices in Shy’s model is demonstrated where switching costs are identical, this case 
is actually not predicted by the model. Point (a) of Proposition 1 in the present paper remedies that 
problem since it shows that the larger firm may even have consumers with negative switching costs.  
All measures of switching costs given by Shy (2002b) when applying his model to the Finnish 
banking industry in 1997 are also supported by our proposition. In particular, the measure of the cost 
of switching from bank 3 to the smallest bank ($464) is no longer an exception in the present paper. 
Consider bank 3 as firm a and the smallest bank (bank 4) as firm b. From Table 2 of Shy (2002b, p. 
80) we can calculate the switching cost in the opposite direction (from bank b to a). We obtain ≈ 4.64. 
Since sab = 464 is greater than bas))1/(( αα −  = (4 051 852 / 952 093) × 4.64 = 19.7. This case is 
predicted by (b) in our proposition, while the negative value of switching costs for consumers willing 
to switch to the largest bank (bank 1 in the Table) is predicted by point (c). 
4. Conclusion and discussion 
This paper increases the predictive power of the undercut-proof property (UPP) introduced by Shy 
(2002b). We show that more rigorous conditions relating the values of switching costs to market 
shares are necessary in order for UPP prices to be valid predictions of these costs. The situation where 
the larger firm charges a higher price is taken into account, making the model more realistic. A 
negative consumer cost for a switch to the smallest competitor is also predicted by the model, a 
situation which is common in empirical applications. This improvement in the predictive power of 
Shy’s model should contribute to making the UPP more able to explain the data in future laboratory 
experiments. We also expect that it will motivate more applied researchers to use the UPP to the 
measurement of switching costs in markets with apparent consumer inertia. A next and quite 
important step in this research could consist of providing a probabilistic framework for testing a 
hypothesis on the values found for switching costs where some of these values appear very similar.  
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2. Situation (d) of equal market shares is not very likely to occur. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: for given bT  and nβ , firm a chooses the highest price aT  subject to  
( )b b a abn T N T sβπ = ≥ −  (A1) 
Simultaneously, for given aT  and nα , firm b chooses the highest price bT  subject to  
( )a a b ban T N T sαπ = ≥ −  (A2) 
Let’s find the UPP prices and associated market shares. It can be shown that (A1) and (A2) hold with 
equality. This system has a solution in prices if 02 >− βαnnN . We obtain,  
βα
α
βα
β
nnN
snNsNT
nnN
snNsNT abbab
baab
a −
+=−
+=
22
)( ,)(  (A3) 
As consumers spread across firms, there are three possible cases for ( )UU nn βα , . (i): ( )0,N ; (ii): 
( ), 0N ; (iii): ( ),N Nα β . Subtract b’s price from a’s ( βα αβ nnN snsnNTT baabba −−=− 2 )( ). Cases (i) and (ii) are 
not equilibriums. From (2a), (2b), a b abT T s− >  is associated with ( ),n nα β = ( )0,N  whereas price 
differential at equilibrium from (A3) is a b abT T s− = . Similarly, a b baT T s− < −  is associated with 
( ),n nα β = ( ), 0N  whereas price differential is baUbUa sTT −=− . In case (iii), price differential is 
βα
αβ
NNN
sNsNNTT baabUbUa −
−=−
2
)(
. The relative values of sba and sab determine several equilibrium.  Denote 
δ  as ββα NNN /)( − .  
Under case (iii), prices satisfy the UPP if ba a b abs T T s− ≤ − ≤ , i.e. 
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ab
baab
ba sNNN
sNsNNs ≤−
−≤−
βα
αβ
2
)(
 (A4) 
This double inequality imposes some restrictions on the relative values of markets shares and 
switching costs. Replace absNβ  with 1 2( )ab abN s N N N N sβ α β
−± −  then price differential is: 
βα
αα
NNN
NssNNs baabab −
+−
2
)(  (A5) 
Similarly, if we replace basNα  with 1 2( )ba baN s N N N N sα α β
−± −  we obtain 
βα
ββ
NNN
NssNNs abbaba −
++−
2
)(
 (A6) 
If switching costs are positive, (A4) is easy to verify. Switching costs can however be negative, which 
requires the constraints that the second terms in both (A5) and (A6) be simultaneously greater or 
equal to zero. This leads us to the relationship between market shares and switching costs stated in 
Proposition 1. We finally mention two particular cases which are easy to demonstrate: baab ss )1( δ+=  
and 0≡δ  (firms share the market equally). In the first case, firms charge the same price. In the second 
case, 
2 ( )
3a b ab ba
T T s s− = − . 
 
 
 
 
 
